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  Going Public When You Can in Biotechnology 
 
  by Michael R. Darby and Lynne G. Zucker 
 
Finance Professor:  What were the factors which made it optimal to 
raise money through an initial public offering at this time? 
New Biotech Millionaire:  Because I could. 
 
  This joke sums up a disconnect between the academic literature on the one hand and both 
Main and Wall Streets on the other.  The scientist-entrepreneurs prominent in the biotech and other 
high-technology industries view going public not so much as a sometimes reasonably priced 
alternative source of working capital as a cross between a well-earned sale of a now-proven 
innovation embodied in a firm and the winning of a lottery.   
  The use of modern biotechnology mushroomed from nonexistent in 1975 to over 700 firms 
by 1990 in the United States alone.  Of those firms, some 512 were new entrants, most of which 
were attempting both to successfully apply the new bioscience breakthroughs to create 
commercially valuable products and to go public insuring the survival of the firm and wealthy 
founders and early investors.  By 1992, 162 of these firms had traded publicly including 156 (30.5 
percent of the 512 entrants) which made an initial public offering (IPO).
1  These firms are an 
attractive natural experiment for understanding the IPO process.   
  This paper is unique in beginning with a universe of non-public firms and analyzing the 
determinants of the probability a firm will go public in a given year and, if it does, the amount of 
capital which it raises in the IPO.  Deeds, Decarolis, and Coombs (1997) and Stephan and Everhart 
(1998) have previously examined the amount raised in biotech IPOs for those firms that go public 
during their time frame, but we are able to add to and improve on their analyses in several ways.  2 
First, because of our rich data resources from the larger biotechnology project, we are to examine all 
IPOs occurring over a much longer period than could either of those research teams.  Second, 
because we have the universe of private firms, we are able to apply the Tobit technique to properly 
estimate the funding amounts conditional on the probability that a firm goes public. 
  Finally, and most important, we have much more information on the scientists involved in 
firms and are able specifically to identify publications with star scientists that are joint with the 
firms.  These joint publications identify the labor effort that has been moved over to the firm by top 
scientists, those scientists who have made breakthrough discoveries in genetic sequencing.
2  The 
importance of this labor effort has been documented in a series of substantive analyses, predicting a 
wide variety of performance measures from patents and products to employment growth.  In our 
most recent analyses, we examine publications joint with firm scientists by all scientists in the 
relevant science areas and by the stars (Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong 2002).  We find that stars’ 
joint publications provide a significant increment above the significant positive effect of all 
scientists that are co-publishing with firm scientists on a variety of performance measures, 
especially strong and consistent in panel analyses. 
  Our story, then, is that access to tacit knowledge held by the discovering scientists has a 
strong and consistent impact on firms’ performance.  Such tacit knowledge is best communicated 
from discovering to firm scientists by working jointly at the lab bench.  Learning-by-doing-with 
limits the speed of diffusion of the knowledge, conferring natural excludability.  We find traces of 
this process and its strong impact in both biotechnology and semiconductors (on semiconductors, 
see Torero, Darby, and Zucker 2001).  Number of articles or citations measures of their quality fail 
to capture the process of transmitting tacit knowledge held by the discovering scientists that our co-
publication measured has been designed to uncover.  3 
  We argue that the strong positive effects of access to this tacit knowledge on firm 
performance alters the financial prospects of the firm, making it easier to find capital and to obtain it 
in larger amounts.  This is true of early funding by venture capitalists and of funding through an 
IPO.  Since firms with collaborating relationships with star scientists are more likely to go public, 
censoring firms that do not go public means that the total effects of stars on financial success of 
firms are seriously underestimated.  Here, we investigate the full process, from birth through IPO, of 
a substantial portion of those dedicated biotech firms that ever go public. 
 4 
I.  Hypotheses 
 
  Biotechnology is characteristic of many industries born based on scientific and/or 
technological breakthroughs that make it possible to do what was before impossible or 
impossibly uneconomical.  Literally hundreds if not thousands of firms entered each time to 
exploit such breakthroughs as the internal combustion engine, the integrated circuit, 
biotechnology, and, most recently, the internet.  As the industries mature and rapidly grow, a 
relatively small number of firms grow rapidly while most stagnate, shrink, or exit through 
merger or failure. 
  The entrant biotech firm must win or at least place in repeated rounds of beauty contests 
if it is to attract sufficient funding from angel investors, venture capitalists, and ultimately public 
investors to fund the long years of research and clinical trials which typically lie between 
brilliant idea and marketed, revenue-producing product.  The firms that will be most successful 
in passing through rounds of financing and simultaneously achieving sufficient R&D success to 
be an attractive contestant will be those with the deepest scientific base.   
For private firms, we do not have the rich data sets available to students of public firms, 
but our previous work has identified some key variables which serve as useful indicators of a 
high-quality science base and of interim progress toward ultimate profitability.  As discussed 
above, the single most powerful indicator of ultimate success is the active working involvement 
of the star scientists who – although small in number -- are responsible for a large fraction of the 
most important discoveries.  When these scientists become involved in commercializing their 
discoveries, they frequently have the insight and scientific taste to identify the sweet spot where 
scientific possibility and economic payoff are combined.  A simple indicator of the level of 5 
technological sophistication of a biotech firm in the 1980s was whether or not it was actively 
using the recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology, also referred to as genetic engineering.  The 
presence of nearby top-quality universities appears to be valuable also, although it is not clear 
whether this represents the presence of stars unidentified by our empirical definition, 
geographically localized knowledge spillovers, or the pecuniary externalities inherent in 
subsidized training of labor and geographic agglomerations generally. 
  We usually use patents granted as an indicator of R&D productivity although it is often 
remarked that it may be a better indicator of past R&D expenditures than production of valuable 
innovation (Griliches 1990).  Since we do not have a history of R&D expenditure data available 
for these private firms, this collinearity may be a blessing despite implying some difficulty iin 
interpretation. 
  Unlike these proven scientific indicators, we also try in some regressions a count of the 
number of SBIR grants received by the firm.
3  The number of SBIR grants received might be 
expected to reduce the probability of remaining private either because the resources permit creation 
of more intellectual property or serve as a government certification that the firm is doing good 
science (the “halo effect”) or for both reasons.  Venture capitalists sometimes see this and similar 
government programs as competitive, so including venture-capital and SBIR funding in the same 
regression permits us to assess whether these funding sources are equally valued in the financial 
markets. 
We also expect that the firm’s history of receiving venture capital investments will have a 
positive impact on the probability of the firm going public.  First of all, venture capitalists are 
investors themselves and their funding connotes their expectation that they will be able to exit 
after a few years via a successful public offering.  Their investment and due diligence also 6 
provide a behavioral signal upon which uninformed investors can cascade (Banerjee 1992, 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992, and Welch 1992). 
As is well known there are waves – or “windows” – in which financing of particular 
technologies is in vogue and IPOs are particularly favorable for firms that are “ready” to go in 
terms of a technology at least a reasonably proven in the laboratory.  We thus expect firms more 
likely to go public in periods following rapid increases in biotech stock prices. 
We include a final variable to help distinguish between two types of firms:  those that are 
founded in hopes of becoming a major player by proceeding trough rounds of private financing 
to the IPO and beyond and those that in fact are intended by the proprietor to remain indefinitely 
a small or medium sized firm with a narrow scope and private ownership.  The only variable we 
have found which distinguishes at all effectively between firm types is the fraction of private 
biotech firms going public in the year of founding.  Our fieldwork suggests that number of 
scientists founded eventually successful firms in order to imitate if not outdo the commercial 
success of the suddenly rich rival down the university corridor. 
  IPOs for high-technology firms are things of remarkable beauty:  Investors provide large 
amounts of money to firms with few employees and relatively few assets beyond some lab 
equipment and the brains of the personnel represented by accumulated losses which have proven – 
more or less – the plausibility of the firm’s nascent technology succeeding in the market.  Investors 
in these firms seek to diversify their portfolios in the hope that 2 or 3 winners will much more than 
compensate for the inevitable 40 or 50 losers.  Not surprisingly, a significant minority of IPOs 
involve firms which are more or less fraudulent.  We hypothesize that investors will foresee this 
possibility and provide more funding to firms in which star scientists are actually involved in bench 7 
level science for the firm (indicated for us by joint publications) than merely lending their name to a 
scientific advisory board. 
  Aghion and Tirole (1994) provide a more general analysis of why investors would place a 
higher value on firms in which the research principals are deeply involved.  Deeds, Decarolis and 
Coombs (1997) give a signalling interpretation to their finding that proceeds increase with the 
number of citations to publications authored by the full-time executives and employees of the firm.  
Stephan and Everhart (1998) confirm for two years of IPOs the value of highly cited scientists 
associated with the firm.  We have emphasized the importance of having the best scientists to the 
real productivity of the firm’s research and development efforts (Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong 
1998, and Darby, Liu, and Zucker 1990). 
  Without necessity to choose among these motivations here, we hypothesize that the amount 
of IPO proceeds raised if and when the firm goes public will be greater the deeper the science base 
of the firm. 
  We also expect that the firm’s history of receiving venture capital investments and p”hot 
market” conditions indicated by prior high biotech returns will have positive impacts on the 
amount the firm is able to raise for very much the same reason that each factor increases the 
probability that the firm goes public. 
 8 
II.  Data 
 
  Estimating the probability that private firms go public is inherently data constrained since by 
definition they are under no compulsion to make public disclosures in the systematic and detailed 
ways that public firms must.  However, a surprising amount of information can be gained by coding 
the data contained in commercial directories which serve to attract customers and by matching to 
this data information on recipients of venture capital, assignees of patents, and affiliations of authors 
of scientific papers covering areas closely related to the firms’ technologies.  Since 1988 we have 
been building a matched, linked, and cleaned data base for examining the interaction among firms, 
universities, research institutes, and scientists involved in biotechnology.  Detailed description of the 
data used in this paper is reported in the Data Appendix.  Here we outline the sources and definition 
of the main variables as a way of introduction to the empirical results and temptation to delve into 
the data appendix. 
  The principle themes of our research are: (1) Biotechnology -- like many new scientific 
breakthroughs with commercial value – was characterized by tacit knowledge transferable only by 
working at the bench level with scientists who have mastered its practice – often as the original 
discoverers but sometimes through sophisticated reverse engineering.  Firms that wanted to practice 
the key technology of genetic engineering had to learn its techniques from someone who already 
knew them.  (2) The very best “star” scientists were the most effective engines of transfer and 
guides to commercial application of the new methods. 
  The scientists developed a central data depositary GenBank for reporting genetic-sequence 
discoveries and reporting was effectively enforced worldwide by requirements at all the major 
journals that appropriate GenBank accession codes be reported prior to publication for any article 9 
involving such discoveries.  We used this GenBank to identify the 307 most productive researchers 
in the world defined as those who had discovered over 40 sequences by April 1990.  At the 
insistence of bioscientist critics, we added another twenty stars on the basis of publishing twenty or 
more articles reporting genetic sequence discoveries.
4  We hand collected the stars articles and 
identified all the authors and their affiliations on each article.  This is the source of our count of 
“tied” articles written by a star as or with a firm’s employees, a variable which has proved a 
powerful indicator of star involvement and hence future firm success. 
  We similarly compiled a universe of 752 biotech firms that had operated at some time 
through 1990 and matched that list to assignee names in the patent records and to information on the 
geographic region(s) in which the firms operated.  We also coded whether the firms reported using 
the recombinant DNA technology (rDNA) in the industry directories or were licensed by Stanford 
and the University of California to do so. 
  We obtained data on the date of IPOs and the proceeds raised using Bioscan (1989-1997), 
its precursor Cetus Corp. (1988), the IPO Reporter, and the Securities Data Company (1998a) 
Global New Issues on-line electronic data base.  Moody’s manual and purchased copies of tIPO 
prospectus were used to resolve a few instances of conflict among these sources. 
  We constructed a biotech equity index based on a portfolio consisting of all publicly traded 
biotech-using firms (including incumbent adopters) in our biotech firm data set.  Whether and how 
many rounds of venture capital were received was obtained by use of the Securities Data Company 
(1998b) VentureXpert on-line electronic database. 10 
III.  Empirical Results 
  In this section we first report estimates on the probability per period that a private biotech 
firm will go public and assess the cumulative impact of the firm’s science base on this probability.  
We then estimate Tobit regressions explaining the amount raised given that the firm goes public.  
The effects of the firm’s  science base are even stronger for proceeds than for duration to IPO.  
Finally, we examine what appears to be a reciprocal causal relationship between the firm’s science 
base and its receipts of venture capital funding. 
 
III.A.  Duration to IPO Results 
 
  In Table 2 we report estimates of standard Weibull survival models explaining the duration 
from the founding of the firm to the firm’s initial public offering (if any).  In the (unfortunate) 
terminology used for these models positive coefficients indicate greater probabilities of surviving as 
a private firm so negative coefficients indicate a greater probability of exiting – that is, making an 
initial public offering. 
  In column (a) of Table 2 we present our simplest model in which the duration to IPO is 
predicted by six variables:  three indicators of the firm’s science base, the percentage of biotech 
firms going public the year the firm was founded, and two indicators of whether there is a ”hot” 
biotech market.  The three variables describing the firm’s science base are the number of articles 
written to date by star scientists as or with a firm employee, the number of eventually granted 
patents applied for to date, and whether or not the firm uses rDNA technology.  Despite some 
multicollinearity, each of these variables is significant at the 5 percent or better level, and the chi-
squared test at the bottom of the table indicates that we can reject the joint hypothesis that all the 
science-base coefficients in this model (or any of the models in Table 2) are zero at better than the 11 
0.001 level of confidence.    The percentage of biotech firms going public in the year the firm was 
founded is also very significant, indicating that a high IPO rate leads to imitative entry of firms 
pursuing the same strategy.  Finally, whether the biotech market has experienced high returns in the 
previous year also very significantly reduces the probability that a private firm will remain private.  
Thus these results all closely correspond to our basic hypotheses about what drives the process of 
high-tech firms going public. 
  In models (b) and (c) we consider the issue of whether in fact the science base is important 
only because it attracts venture capital support or whether it works separately in terms of pure 
productivity of producing new, valuable intellectual property.  After some experimentation, we 
found that the best available indicators of venture capital support were simply the dummy variable 
for ever having such support or the count of the number of rounds of support received.  All the 
indicators are highly correlated, and we suspect that omissions in the SDC survey coverage 
introduce significant measurement error into the alternative venture-capital-funds-received variables 
which we tried.  We introduce the dummy and cumulative rounds separately because 
multicollinearity becomes severe when both are in the same equation.  In any case, we get similar 
results:  The venture capital variables are indeed highly enough correlated with the science-base 
variables to make it difficult to measure their separate effects robustly, but – based on the chi-
squared test – we see that both science-base variables as a group and venture capital support 
increase the likelihood of going public.  The results for the strategy and market indicators are 
qualitatively the same for all the models reported in Table 2. 
  In models (d) and (e) we report the results from experimentation with other science base 
indicators which we have used in our other work on biotechnology.  The number of SBIR grants 
received might be expected to reduce the probability of remaining private either because the 12 
resources permit creation of more intellectual property or serve as a government certification that 
the firm is doing good science (the “halo effect”) or for both reasons.
5  Similarly the number of 
nearby universities with top-ranked biotech-relevant doctoral programs serves as an indicator of 
geograpically localized knowledge spillovers and/or favorable labor cost conditions.
6  Again, the 
science-base coefficients are all negative as expected.  However, although as a group they are highly 
significant in explaining the probability of going public, the individual coefficients are not robustly 
statistically significant except for whether or not the firm does genetic engineering (uses rDNA 
technology). 
  One way to interpret the survival models is to simulate them using different assumptions for 
the values of the determining variables.  This is done in Table 3 for model (e) of Table 2.  Table 3 
reports the predicted number of years from firm founding that it would take for a cohort of firms 
with given characteristics to reach various percentages of firms having gone public.
7  The base 
case assumes for each year of the simulation that the surviving firms have the mean values for 
firms their age of each of the variables in model (e).  Case (c) sets all the science base variables 
at 0 instead of their mean values and reruns the simulation.  The difference between case (a) and 
case (c) indicates the estimated reduction in duration to IPO due to the combined effects of all 
the firms’ science-base variables.  Case (b) is like case (a) except it sets at 0 all the science base 
variables other than the number of Articles to Date by Stars with Firm (“ties”) and the indicator 
for Use of rDNA Technology (“rtech”).  Comparing all three cases, we see that overall the 
science-base variables reduced the time to IPO by a little over a third and a little more than half 
of this reduction is attributable to the number of articles the firms have authored with stars and to 
the use of genetic engineering.  Figure 1 plots the simulated effects in Table 3, illustrating 13 
graphically the economically significant effect of the firm’s science base holding constant the 
market-condition variables and the firm’s strategy and receipts of venture capital. 
  Taken as a whole, Table 2 implies that market-conditions and the firm’s science base, 
strategy, and receipts of venture capital all play significant roles in determining the probability per 
year that a particular private biotech firm will go public.  We cannot robustly characterize which 
science-base indicators are the most important, but the use of genetic engineering was always 
significant in determining which firms were able to go IPO when the market conditions were 
favorable. 
 
III.B.  Results on Proceeds from the IPO 
 
  Going public is much like the consumer buying a car, there is not only the of whether it is 
done at all, but also, if it is done, how much money is involved.  Accordingly, we turn to estimating 
the funds raised in those IPOs that do occur using the Tobit technique.  The results are reported in 
Table 4.  Although the reported coefficient estimates do not have the easy interpretation of OLS 
regressions, significant positive coefficients do mean that the variable results in a predicted increase 
in IPO proceeds if an IPO occurs. 
  Models (a), (b), and (c) estimate the Tobit regression with the core science base variables 
(articles by stars with or as firm employees, patents granted applied for by this date, and use of 
rDNA technology), two-year lagged biotech returns as our market indicator, and no, dummy, or 
round count venture-capital variables.
8  Unlike the survival models, we obtain distinct highly 
significant, positive coefficients for each of these variables in explaining how much money the firm 
can raise.  The market indicator and venture capital variables also have robustly significant, positive 
coefficients in Table 4. 14 
  In models (d) and (e) we add the SBIR and local top-quality universities variables, but only 
the latter has significant, positive coefficients.  It appears that investors in initial public offerings are 
much more impressed by investments by other private investors than by government bureaucrats 
allocating SBIR funds.   
  Table 5 computes the partial derivatives of expected IPO proceeds with respect to each of 
the variables in the Table 4 models assuming in each case that all the variables are at their sample-
mean values.  Each article written by a star as or with a firm employee increases IPO proceeds by 
from $0.9 to $1.3 million depending on model specification.  The effect on the value of the firm will 
typically be a significant multiple of these derivative amounts since only a fraction of the equity 
value is sold at IPO.  Each patent is worth between $1 and $2 million as is the use of rDNA 
technology.  A nearby top-quality university adds from $0.5 to $0.7 million to IPO proceeds.   
Receiving venture capital is worth about $3.3 million in IPO proceeds as a yes or no matter or about 
$0.6 million per round of venture capital received.  Higher prior returns also increase current IPO 
proceeds. 
  As with the probability of going public, the firm’s science base, market-conditions, and 
receipts of venture capital all play distinct and significant roles in determining the amount of money 
raised by the firms that indeed do go public.  In this case, we can robustly characterize the impact of 
four distinct indicators of the science base, with only SBIR grants failing to make a significant 
positive contribution.. Also as with the probability of going public, the use of genetic engineering an 




III.C.  Granger Causality Analysis of the Firm’s Science Base and Venture Capital Funding 
  Table 6 reports the results of Granger causality tests to see whether venture-capital funding 
enables the firm to engage in more joint research with star scientists or whether more joint research 
with star scientists enables the firm to get venture-capital funding.  As is often the case with these 
experiments the results are somewhat ambiguous, but we believe they are most consistent with the 
view that the variables are mutually reinforcing in a virtuous circle in which more of each increases 
the other. 
  The particular difficulty in using the Granger methodology here is that we do not have a 
clear dating of when the work which culminates in an article published on a given date was actually 
done.  The firm would be sure that potential venture-capital funders were aware of star involvement 
in the firm while it was actually in process as opposed to completed, submitted, revised, and 
eventually published.  Table 6 reports Granger causality tests assuming that the work was done 
precisely two years before the article was published.  In this case we can reject both the hypothesis 
that star articles does not cause venture-capital funding and the hypothesis that venture-capital 
funding does not cause star articles, implying reciprocal causality.  If one believes that the R&D 
work plus publication must have significantly exceeded two years, then the hypothesis that venture-
capital funding does not cause star articles becomes tenable.  If, on the other hand, one believes that 
the R&D work plus publication takes only one year, then the hypothesis that star articles do not 
cause venture-capital funding becomes tenable. 
  We see reciprocal causality as the most reasonable interpretation of the results.  On the other 
hand, based on extensive interviews with the scientists involved, we find it much more plausible 
that the work plus publication process significantly exceeds two years than that it is significantly 
less.  Thus, there is stronger evidence for star articles to venture funding than for the reverse. 16 
IV.  Conclusions 
 
  This paper starts from a universe of private biotech firms and estimates survival models 
to explain the probability each year that a particular firm will go public.  We find that a stronger  
science base, venture capital funding, and a hot market all increase the probability that the firm 
will go public.  Our most surprising finding on duration to IPO was the power of imitation -- or 
envy:  Firms founded in years with exceptionally high IPO rates are themselves significantly 
more likely to eventually go public. 
  We also find that a stronger science base, venture capital funding, and a prior hot market 
all increase the expected amount of money that the firm will raise if it does go public.  In the 
case of proceeds raised, we can estimate strongly significant and distinct positive contributions 
for four of our five science-base indicators – the only exception being the number of SBIR grants 
received.  Each article written by a star scientist as or with a firm employee increases IPO proceeds 
by around $1 million and each patent by $1-2 million.  Each nearby top-quality university or round 
of venture capital adds about $0.6 million to IPO proceeds.  Thus star articles are worth nearly as 
much as a patent in terms of firm value and about twice as much as a round of venture-capital 
financing.  As to the chicken-egg question, the evidence is most consistent with mutual (i.e., two 
way) star-articles and venture-capital causation, but if we had to choose one-way causation our 
reading would be that star involvement in a firm is more likely to bring venture-capital financing 
than is venture-capital financing to attract star involvement. 
We conclude that available data on the financing and science base of private biotech 
firms is sufficiently rich to permit meaningful estimation of both duration and proceeds models 
for IPOs.  It remains for future research to apply the same methods to other high-tech industries. 17 
Data Appendix 
 
  In this paper we use Zucker-Darby data sets developed for the Project on “Intellectual 
Capital, Technology Transfer and the Organization of Leading-Edge Industries: The Case of 
Biotechnology.”  The basic data sets developed for this project are described in Zucker, Darby, and 
Brewer (1994, 1998); details of how we defined star ties to firms through co-authorship on scientific 
articles—either by affiliation to the firm or by linkage via co-authorship with firm employees—can 
be found in Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (1998).  These data have been or will be archived upon 
completion of the project in the Data Archives at the UCLA Institute for Social Science Research 
(ISSR). 
 
A.1.  Firms “At Risk” for an IPO 
  The firms at risk for going public are the 512 NBFs, among the 752 identified U.S. biotech 
enterprises.  The remainder of the firms are either incumbents (150) or could not be classified 
clearly into either subcategory (90). 
  Each NBF is geo-coded as being located in one of the 183 functional economic areas (BEA 
areas) as defined by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
A.2.  Measures of Science and Invention 
  We use five measures of “science-ness” of the firm: cumulative number of articles with 
affiliated and tied star scientists, cumulative number of patents granted (using the application date), 
use of rDNA technology by the firm, cumulative number of SBIR (Small Business Innovation 18 
Research) grants awarded to the firm, and the number of local—in the same BEA area—top-quality 
universities. 
  Star Scientists:  Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1994; 1998) demonstrate the key role played in 
determining where and when NBEs are founded by intellectual capital, in particular by where and 
when leading frontier scientists ("stars") are actively publishing.  Given the fundamental role of 
rDNA in modern biotechnology, a very important measure of research success in the basic science 
is the discovery of nucleotide sequences that determine the characteristics of proteins and other 
molecules.  In the earlier stages of the project, GenBank was used to identify all articles reporting 
gene sequence discoveries up to 1990.
9  Worldwide 327 leading researchers (the "stars") were 
identified on the basis of the number of genetic sequence discoveries (over 40) and articles reporting 
them (20 or more) up to April 1990 for which they were an author.  Of these, 107 published at some 
time in the U.S. 
  These 327 stars were listed as authors on 4,061 distinct articles in major journals.  These 
articles were hand collected and used to identify and locate institutional affiliations at the time of 
publication for each of our stars and their coauthors who were either other stars or "collaborators" 
(6,082 scientists worldwide).  This hand coding was necessary at that time because available 
machine-readable data bases gave only the location of the first author who, given the authorship 
conventions of the field, is rarely a star scientist. 
  In an extension of that work (Zucker, Darby and Armstrong 1998), we introduced the 
concept of a scientist become “tied” to the firm.  We weight each star by the number of articles each 
has published with firm scientists.  Tied scientists are a combination of those that list the firm as an 
affiliation (we call these elsewhere “affiliated scientists”) and those that list a scientist from that firm 
as a co-author (“linked scientists”).  19 
  Patent Data:  We obtained the patent data for each biotech firm from the U.S. Department 
of Commerce (1993) CD-ROM Patent Technology Set: Genetic Engineering produced by the 
Office of Electronic Information Products and Services of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  
All patents were included in our analyses: class 935 (all subclasses) or class 435 (subclass 172.3 
only) of the U.S. Patent Classification System.  Class 935 is entitled Genetic Engineering:   
Recombinant DNA Technology, Hybrid or Fused Cell Technology and Related Manipulations of 
Nucleic Acids.  It is a collection of patents which disclose:  (a) processes of altering the genetic 
structure of microorganisms, (b) genes and methods of modifying genes and their expression, (c) 
vectors and methods of modifying vectors, (d) methods of introducing DNA into a cell, (e) 
microorganisms per se which have had their genetic sequences altered by recombinant DNA 
techniques or by cell fusion or by uptake of DNA, (f) testing, (g) separation techniques (h) 
apparatus, (i) methods of use of vectors or of the genetically engineered microorganisms, and (j) 
methods of gene therapy or genetic modification of living organisms.  Class 435, subclass 172.3, 
includes patents which disclose methods and materials of recombinant DNA technology.  Thus, 
these patent classes cover the core inventions of modern biotechnology. 
  The Patent Technology Sets include patents which issued through January 26, 1993, and 
which were included in above classifications as of June 29, 1993.  We counted the number of 
patents granted to the firm using year of application date through 1991.  We used year of application 
because the work underlying the patent had by then been done and would be available for disclosure 
-- and normally would be disclosed -- to the financial markets in the event of an IPO.  We also 
calculated the total patents applied for by each firm from 1976 to 1991 which were later granted. 
  rDNA Technology: We also coded (1 yes, 0 no) whether the firms reported using the 
recombinant DNA technology (rDNA) in BioScan, the leading commercial directory of biotech-20 
producing firms, or were licensed by Stanford and the University of California to do so.   This 
rDNA technology is a marker of a high-science firm. 
  SBIR Awards: Small Business Innovation Research grants are a set-aside program of all 
Federal agencies that make any research grants. 
  Top Quality Universities: There are 20 U.S. universities with biotech-relevant departments 
receiving the highest ratings (rated above 4 on a scale of 5) on overall scholarly quality as reported 
in the 1982 National Academy of Sciences’ reputational survey of doctoral programs (Jones, 
Lindzey and Coggeshall 1982).
10  Biotech-relevant departments included biochemistry, 
cellular/molecular biology, and/or microbiology. 
 
A.3.  IPO Variables 
  In our study, we define IPO proceeds as the capital raised by company in the IPO before 
transaction fees and including known over-allotment.  There are four main sources from which we 
obtained biotech IPO dates and proceeds data: (1) BioScan (1989-1997); (2) BioScan’s precursor 
Cetus Corp. (1988); (3) IPO Reporter, a weekly publication: and (4) Global New Issues, an on-line 
electronic data base produced by Securities Data Company (1998a) with data on over 72,000 U.S. 
IPOs since 1970. 
  In most cases, the dates and proceeds from different sources matched.  There are several 
cases in which we did not have matched IPO data: (1) Data missing in one or more of our sources 
generally could be replaced with data from Global New Issues that was the most comprehensive in 
coverage; (2) Different data was occasionally reported in different sources, but generally we could 
use data from Global New Issues to determine which values were most accurate.  In most cases, 
differences could be identified as due to rounding errors, transaction fees, over-allotments, or 21 
foreign proceeds (which we excluded).  For those cases where we could not reconcile the 
differences by referring to our four primary sources, we checked the Moody’s manual.  Generally, 
Moody’s would verify one of the data values we had.  In three cases, we had to purchase copies of 
the IPO prospectus in question to obtain cleaned and verified IPO data. 
  In our search, we found that 162 of the 512 biotech entrants began public trading during the 
1976-1992 period.  We dropped 6 of these companies that became publicly traded without an IPO 
through spin-offs or merger of a private company with one already trading publicly.  We ended up 
with 156 biotech IPOs between 1976 and 1992.  For each of these cases, we obtained the exact IPO 
date and the proceeds raised. 
  We counted the number of biotech IPOs in each year from 1976 to 1992 at the U.S. level 
and then subdivided the total into 183 regional observations for each of the functional economic 
areas ("BEA areas" for short) into which the U.S. is divided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in 
U.S. Department of Commerce (1992).  We also calculated the total proceeds raised in IPOs in each 
year at both levels.  In our study, we also examined use of the cumulative number of biotech IPOs 
and the cumulative value of biotech IPO proceeds as control variables. 
  For all IPO value variables, we calculated their deflated values in terms of 1983 U.S. dollars 
by using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers as reported in the Economic Report of 
the President  (February 1995).  We also considered the equivalent values of proceeds in 1989 
where proceeds from years before 1989 grow according to compound interest using a short-term 
interest rate.  The short-term rate we use in these calculations is the U.S. average annual 3 month 
certificate of deposit rate as listed in the International Monetary Fund's International Financial 
Statistics for October 1994. 
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A.4.  Biotech Equity Index and Returns 
  We define a biotech equity index and use its returns to measure the overall performance of 
biotech stocks.  We considered two different portfolios constructed to calculate monthly weighted 
returns from January 1975 to December 1995: (1) Our basic biotech equity index is defined based 
on a portfolio consisting of all publicly traded biotech-using firms (including incumbent adopters) in 
our larger project biotech firm data set.  (2) We defined an alternative portfolio consisting of all 
publicly traded firms in the biotech-relevant Standard Industrial Classifications 2830 through 2836, 
inclusive.  We retrieved return data from CRSP and calculated the monthly weighted returns for 
each portfolio.  Based on these monthly returns, we calculated annualized returns for each portfolio.  
In this paper, we use the annualized weighted returns of the first portfolio since the second portfolio 
included numerous non-biotech using firms. 
 
 
A.5.  Venture Capital Investment Variables 
 
We use a number of venture capital investment variables based on data available in the 
VentureXpert on-line electronic database (maintained by the Securities Data Company 1998b).  
The database contains detailed information on the date, stage, and amount for each round of 
funding for each firm.  We drop “Bridge”, “Bridge Loan”, “Open Market Purchase”, “Other 
Spec Situation”, “Secondary Purchase”, and “Turnaround” stage funding.  We drop observations 
where there are missing values on date or on the amount of venture capital investment.  
Based on these data, we calculated the rounds of venture capital and amount of venture 
capital received by each firm in each year.  The latter value is converted into 1984 US dollars.  
For both the number of rounds and the amount of venture capital, we calculated the cumulative 
values up through the current year.  Additionally, we constructed a categorical variable (1 yes, 0 23 
no) indicating whether each of the firms has ever been reported as receiving venture capital.  
This variable equals 1 if the value of the cumulative rounds variable is nonzero. 
 24 
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1 The other 6 firms became publicly traded through merger with a public company or spinoff. 
2 Factors that predict stars working with firms are identified in Zucker, Darby, and Torero 
(2002). 
3 The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) sets aside for small-business contracts and 
grants a portion of all federal research funding programs and a number of the private biotech 
firms obtained research funding from this source. 
4 The scientists who criticized our simple criterion observed that not all sequences are equally 
difficult and some earned an article for only one sequence while others wer reported jointly. 
5 The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) sets aside for small-business contracts and 
grants a portion of all federal research funding programs and a number of the private biotech 
firms obtained research funding from this source. 
6 Top-quality universities are defined as those with a quality ranking of 4.0 or above (on a scale 
of 1 to 5) for one or more of the biotech-relevant doctoral programs in biochemistry, 
cellular/molecular biology, and microbiology in the 1981 National Research Council survey 
(Jones, Lindzey and Coggeshall 1982).  Twenty U.S. universities were so defined as top quality.  
Nearby is defined as in the same BEA area as the firm.  Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) found 
that top-quality universities had a significant positive effect on entry of biotech firms over and 
above that of the number of local actively publishing star scientists. 
7 This table would look like a conventional survival table if we subtract the percentage public 
from 100 percent to get the percentage “surviving” as private firms. 
8 The models were unstable when one-year and two-year lagged biotech returns were included 
simultaneously and those with two-year returns generally had a higher log-likelihood.  We did not 28 
 
include the strategy variable in the proceeds models because it was used to identify firms more 
likely to be pursuing an IPO strategy but would not affect the proceeds of those firms which actually 
do go public. 
9. See Zucker, Brewer, Oliver, and Liebeskind (1993).  The rDNA technology devolved from high 
to routine science in the late 1980s; so 1990 was a good year to end the literature base for 
identifying scientists possessing intellectual capital. 
10 Reputational ratings were based on responses from approximately 15 percent of the faculty in 
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Number of Observations = 3675 
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Table 2 
Estimates of Weibull Survival Model of Duration from Founding to Initial Public Offering 
 
        (a)      (b)      (c)      (d)      (e) 
 
Constant       3.760***    4.111***   4.093***   3.963***  -4.170*** 
   (0.235)   (0.315)   (0.349)   (0.280)   (0.376) 
Firm's Science Base 
Articles to Date by  -0.207*   -0.161
†  -0.235     -0.195* -0.236 
  Stars with Firm  (0.086)   (0.098)   (0.187)   (0.093)   (0.206) 
 
Patents Granted with  -0.266*   -0.167    -0.268     -0.208
†  -0.225 
  Application to Date  (0.117)   (0.162)   (0.172)   (0.119)   (0.176) 
 
Use of rDNA Tech-  -0.519***   -0.271
†  -0.379* -0.494**  -0.365* 
  nology by Firm  (0.153)   (0.145)   (0.169)   (0.153)   (0.170) 
 
Number of SBIR      -         -         -     -0.302
†   -0.328 
    Grants  to  Date       (0.171)   (0.221) 
 
Local Top-Quality      -         -         -     -0.143*  -0.052 
    Universities         (0.066)   (0.072) 
Firm Strategy Indicator 
IPOs/Private  NBFs  -4.347***    -4.050*** -4.304**  -4.392*** -4.248** 
  in Year Firm Born  (1.192)   (1.210)   (1.365)   (1.204)   (1.376) 
Market Indicators 
Biotech  Returns  One  -0.339**    -0.376** -0.393** -0.337** -0.396** 
    Year  Prior   (0.121)   (0.132)   (0.146)   (0.122)   (0.149) 
 
Biotech Returns Two  -0.248    -0.240    -0.325    -0.258    -0.348 
    Years  Prior   (0.192)   (0.203)   (0.232)   (0.196)   (0.237) 
Venture Capital 
Firm Has Rec'd      -    -1.205***      -         -         - 
  Venture Capital      (0.247) 
 
Rounds of Venture      -         -    -0.209***      -    -0.204*** 
    Capital  Received      (0.056)     (0.056) 
Sigma       0.774***    0.779***   0.883***   0.778***   0.886*** 
   (0.089)   (0.097)   (0.135)   (0.091)   (0.137) 
 
Log-likelihood   -607.6   -566.5   -579.5   -602.9   -577.9 
 
Chi-squared test [d.f.]  39.56 [3]***  15.56 [3]***  24.48 [3]***  49.98 [5]***  27.68 [5]*** 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  N = 3675.   
  Prob(| t | > x)  or  Prob(| P
2 | > x):   
† < 0.1, * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001 
The Chi-squared test is for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the firm science-base 
variables all = 0.  The degrees of freedom for the statistic are given in square brackets. 31 
Table 3 




This table presents the predicted number of years from founding for various percentages of a 
cohort of entering private firms to have gone public based on model (e) in Table 2.  Model (e) is 
simulated for three different cohorts:  In the case labeled (a), the firms have the mean values each 
year of all the firms of a given age in our sample.  Case (b) is the same as (a) except that the 
values of the science variables other than the number of Articles to Date by Stars with Firm 
(“ties”) and the indicator for Use of rDNA Technology (“rtech”) are set to 0.  Case (c) is the 
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Estimates of Tobit Regressions for IPO Proceeds 
 
        (a)      (b)      (c)      (d)      (e) 
Constant              -23.026***      -25.017***       -24.909***       -27.610***     -28.044*** 
   (1.034)   (1.017)   (0.349)   (1.220)   (1.215) 
Firm's Science Base 
Articles to Date by   6.806***   5.765***   6.549***   6.001***   5.951*** 
  Stars with Firm  (1.440)   (1.235)   (1.382)   (1.399)   (1.356) 
 
Patents Granted with  10.970***   6.718***   8.548***   9.945***   8.158*** 
  Application to Date  (1.348)   (1.156)   (1.295)   (1.317)   (1.279) 
 
Use of rDNA Tech-  10.570***    6.105***   8.506***  10.232***   8.428*** 
  nology by Firm  (0.915)   (0.817)   (0.893)   (0.895)   (0.880) 
 
Number of SBIR      -         -         -      0.393     -1.036 
    Grants  to  Date       (1.838)   (1.853) 
 
Local Top-Quality      -         -         -      3.917***   2.937*** 
    Universities         (0.383)   (0.377) 
Market Indicator 
Biotech Returns Two   6.390***   6.649***   7.890***   6.376***   7.682*** 
    Years  Prior   (1.232)   (1.109)   (1.213)   (1.208)   (1.196) 
Venture Capital 
Firm Has Rec'd      -    20.711***      -         -         - 
  Venture Capital      (0.932) 
 
Rounds of Venture      -         -     3.612***      -     3.235*** 
    Capital  Received      (0.244)     (0.241) 
 
Sigma      18.996***       16.247***  18.214***  18.410***  17.832*** 
   (0.566)   (0.468)   (0.537)   (0.545)   (0.524) 
      
Log-likelihood  fn.  -4274.0 -3972.1 -4152.0 -4219.3 -4121.2 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  N = 3675.   
Prob(| t | > x): 
† < 0.1, * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001 33 
 
Table 5 
Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables on IPO Proceeds 
 
The table presents the partial derivatives of expected value with respect to the vector of explanatory 
variables. They are computed at the means of the variables based on the corresponding model 
estimates reported in Table 4. 
 
        (a)      (b)      (c)      (d)      (e) 
Firm's Science Base 
Articles to Date by   1.2727***   0.9127***   1.1379***   1.0822***   1.0127*** 
  Stars with Firm  (0.2725)  (0.1991)  (10.2436)  (0.2553)  (0.2340) 
 
Patents Granted with  2.0515***   1.0634***   1.4853***   1.7934***   1.3882*** 
  Application to Date  (0.2577)  (0.1874)  (0.2298)  (0.2433)  (0.2224) 
 
Use of rDNA Tech-  1.9766***    0.9664***   1.4779***  1.8452***   1.4344*** 
  nology by Firm  (0.1674)  (0.1288)  (0.1530)  (0.1583)  (0.1478) 
 
Number of SBIR      -         -         -      0.0709               -0.1764 
    Grants  to  Date       (0.3314)  (0.3154) 
 
Local Top-Quality      -         -         -      0.7064***   0.4998*** 
    Universities         (0.0681)  (0.0639) 
Market Indicator 
Biotech Returns Two   1.1950***   1.0526***   1.3709***   1.1498***   1.3073*** 
    Years  Prior    (0.2292) (0.1747) (0.2091) (0.2169) (0.2020) 
Venture Capital 
Firm Has Rec'd      -    3.2787***      -         -         - 
  Venture Capital      (0.1590) 
 
Rounds of Venture      -         -     0.6275***      -     0.5506*** 
    Capital  Received      (0.0428)    (0.0416) 
 
 
Standard errors in parens.  N = 3675.   
Prob(| t | > x): 




Causality Analysis between Science Variables and Venture Capital Variables 
(Poisson Regressions) 
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   _  0.636* 
(0.251) 
Rounds of venture 
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Log-likelihood fn.   -214.4 
 
-205.9 -1255.6  -1253.4 
Standard errors in parentheses.  N = 2989.   
Prob(| t | > x): 




H0: Venture Capital variable does not cause Star Article 
χ
2 (1) = 17.0*** 
 
H0: Star Article does not cause Venture Capital 
χ




1 We assume it takes two years for an article to be finished and published (i.e., if an article is 
published in year t, we assume its authors were first tied to the firm in year t-2). 35 
Figure 1 
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All Variables = Sample Means--Base Case (a) Science-Base = 0 except ties and rtech--Case (b) Science-Base = 0--Case (c) 